This paper describes shortcomings in the current paradigm for multilevel secure (MLS) syst,ems, summarizes requirements for a.11 a.lt,ernat,e pamdigm, and describes the Multipolicy Pa.radigm. The Multipolicy Paradigm is useful wheuever t.liere a.re multiple security goals such as confident.ialit~y, privacy, a.vailability, integrity, or wea.pons release control; whenever users with different va.lues a.nd tradit.ions must. share a common system; whenever a. system is composed of separatelyeva.luated pieces, a.nd whenever policies must adapt to changing circumst~a.nces. The paper suggests shifts in thinking about. multilevel secure (MLS) systems, and raises important multipolicy issues: policy flexibility, policy conflict resolution, adding user securit$y policies t,o commercial off-t,heshelf (COTS) products, eva,luat,ing a.nd certifying multiple policy systems, and passing sensit.ive dat.a across policy bounda.ries.
Introduction
In this paper we consolida.te a,nd extend the result,s of our research into multipolicy syst,ems [1,2,3,4,5] sponsored by the Air Force Elect,ronic Systems Center. An example is presented illustrat.ing
(1) the interaction of metapolicies with security domains a.nd (2) flexible security policies using user policy tanking.
Overview
The Multipolicy Pa.ra.digm pern1it.s a. mult,ilevel secure (MLS) system to enforce multiple, sometimes contradictory, security policies. Meta.policies, policies about policies, coordinate the enforcement of t,he multiple security policies. Policy doma.in codes on data indicate which securit.y policies to enforce on the data, and multiple label segment,s supply the a.t.-tributes needed for ea.ch policy.
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The Multipolicy Paradigm permits natural modelling of the mult.ipolicy real world. It. permik possibly inconsistent security policies, such as confident,ia.lit,y and integrit.y. to opera.te togeUler. It may provide a. vehicle for users to add t.heir own secr1rit.y policies t,o a. syst.em wit.hout. disrupt iirg or iuvalitlat iitg esisting evaluat.ed policies. It, ii1a.y ease policy iiitegral.ion problems by preserving t.he origiiial classification of data when dat,a. is passed across policy boriutlaries.
Finally, if implement~ecl in high-speed parallel processing architect.ure, it. may improve t.rustetl sysl.ein perform an ce .
Commercial applica.tions include medical. financial, reservation, library, invest.iga.tive and ot,her syskms tha.t cross policy doma.ins.
RIilit,ary applicat.ions iiielude mult.iservice logistics, t.he multkrvice Strat,egic Defense Initiat.ive and Command. Cant rol. and C'ommunicat~ion (C3) syst.ems in inult~iuiit ioual bat l.lc t IIt,-a.ters, like t.he Persian Gulf V\:ar.
Rationale
Integra,ting securit,y policies on today's niult~ilevel secure (MLS) comput,er syst,ems is a difficult., sometimes impossible problem. \Vhen t,hc securit.y policies themselves cannot. be integmted.
t.lte systems built, t,o implement, t,hese policies cannot, be iiit.rgrn.t.etl eit.lier. Sometimes the only way t.0 solve iiiipossible problems is to transcend them. For esa.mple. ~IICII Coperuicu.5 developed a new model of the planetary syslcltl with t.he sun at. t.he cent.er. his paradigm siiiiplifkd pla.netary a.stronomy a.iid init,iat.etl wa.ves of tliscovery by ot.hers. Thomas I\uhu docun1ent.s a. number of these ground-brea.kiiig para.digm shifts in his book, The Structure of Scient,ific R.evolut.ions. Roping for simi1a.r breakthroughs, comput,er securit.y founder Dr.
rity Inc. has proposed a new security paradigm based upon multiple, perhaps contra.dictory, securit,y policies. Multiple security policies may be necessary if:
1.
2.
3.
4.
2
There is more than one securit.y goa.1, such as privacy, confidentiality and integrity;
The system serves diverse constituents with individual goals and plans, such as the United Nations (U.N.), European Community (EC), and other federations;
The system is composed of separately evaluated pieces, such as an MLS Database Management System (Trusted DBMS) a.nd MLS Operating Systems (Trusted OS).
Policies must a.dapt, t,o changing circumst,ances, like moving from peace t,o wa.r.
The Current Paradigm
The current US paradigm is based upon three standards documents described below: t.he TCSEC, the TNI, and the TDI. The current pa.radigm ma.y evolve significantly beca,use of bhe ITSEC, t.he 'ha.rmonized' Eur0pea.n criteria, and t.he Federa. Crit.eria., a. st,andards document focused on commercia.1 syst.em security, now under development at. NIST wit.11 NCSC support.
The TCSEC. The Depart.ment of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Crit,eria (TCSEC). embodies the United States' security pa.ra.digm. The TCSEC prescribes a unified "system securit,y policy" made up of subpolicies such as n4anclatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Cont.rol (DAC) which all cohere together t.0 form a. single system security policy. The unified policy drives the choice of security mechanisms and is t,he founda.tion of most. assurance efforts.
The single-policy paradigm works well with standalone systems but causes problems when syst,ems must be networked or combined and securit,y policy integration is required.
For Ra.e Rums raised t.he inherent secrecy/int,egrit,y conflict,, and Oracle Corp. a.ddressed met.hods for resolving it.. Tra.deoffs bet.ween competing policies a.re oft,en required, and oft.en only t.he ult,ima.te users can det.ermine which policy t,o emphasize. From all t.his work. it. is clear t.hat in a. mult.ipolicy a.ut.omat.ed informat ion syskm t~iiviroiimc-'nt,. it. is crilica.l to specify how policy c0nflict.s slioultl be resolved. 21 Multiple policies may be more complex t,han single policies. Some researchers a.re studying the fundamental properties of policies, which may help t.o reduce this complexity.
Feiler and Dowson explored the relationships between policies sod processes, discovering that policies may conflict and that policies about policies may be necessary.
Moffet and Sloman explored management policies and the need for explicit control authority in the commercial arena. They also explored how to represent and manipulate policies and came to view policies as objects which can be created, destroyed, queried; and which can interact with each other. The Policy Workbench project at George Mason University(GMU) studied intentions implicit in policies, incompleteness in a.ssumpt.ions underlying security policy models, and ways to represent, securit,y policies, including activit,y role cha.rt,s, Pet.ri net.s, data flow diagrams, and struct,ura.l diagra.ms.
Several researchers aim for policy flexibilit,y. Grenier, Hunk, and Funkenha.user differentia.ted policies from mechanisms.
The Planning Resea.rch Corporation (PRC) proposed rule-based policies as a way to escape the inflexibility of built-in policies and clemonstra.ted that assorted rule-bases ca.n be plugged int,o the same system. MITRE's General Framework for Access Control (GFAC) group asserted tl1a.t a.11 policies can be expressed a.s rules specified in terms of attributes and other informa.tion cont.rolled by aut,horities.
Our earlier work introduced several c0ncept.s which are incorporated into this paper.
[l] proposed a. Multipolicy Machine which enforces multiple, possibly contradictory security policies using Met,a. 4.
5.
Sources of policy (Eg. user, administra.tor, government, standards body);
Means of changing policies (Eg. locally, remotely, at sysgen) .
Unlike the current TCSEC paradigm, the Multipolicy Paradigm does not require tl1a.t a unified system policy be developed, or even t,ha,t the policies be consistent. Canada, for example, can implement separate privacy and confidentiality policies on one system[l3], and the EC may keep severad separate hea.lth and financial information privacy policies.
Policies in current systems are usually implemented as instructions in code using user-supplied data from tables for access control, wit.11 inst,ructions in the kernel TCB for system security policies and instructions in applications progra.ms for user policies. In the Multipolicy Paradigm, complex cla.ta. structures will be needed to implement each policy and it,s a.ssocia.ted metapolicies. This implement,a.tioll method can provide both flexibilit,y and assurance.
Multiple Enforcers
Security Policy Enforcers Sccurit.y policy enforcers implement the rules of a policy on t,he subjects and objects within the policy cloma.in. Ea.& enforcer is trusted to protect and enforce the policies in its domain correctly and must be tamperproof. Enforcers may be implemented in several wa,ys. However, it is critical that the policy NOT be built, int,o the enforcer, as it now is in most reference monit.or implement,ations. One enforcer may enforce multiple independenb policies, or multiple policy enforcers may enforce iiiultiple different policies, or multiple versions of the same policy, or multiple subsets of t,he same policy.
Metapolicies Meta.policies a.re policies about, policies. They provide a framework for clarifying policies, explicitly stating the assumptions a.bout policies and the organization's cont.rol process for policies. They also coordinate the intera.ction between policies, explicitly specifying order, priorit,y, and conflictresolution strategies. Metapolicies clarify underlying policy a.ssumptions a.nd rela.tionships, facilit at,e expression of the va.riet,y, richness, and iiiult.ip1icit.y of security policies, a.nd permit t,he cont,rolled int.eraction of policies a.nd subpolicies, making complex policy systems possible [2] . Met~apolicies specify who can set policy, who can change policy, a.nd the procedures for changing policies. They a.lso include rules a.bout, developing, verifying, and prot,ecting securit.y policies and rules about the interaction of multiple securit.y policies, especially where they conflict.. The Multipolicy Paradigm permits mult,iple distinct security policy domains, administered by different organizat.ional entities each wit,11 complete policy a.ut.onomy in it.s domain, to be modeled in a comput,er system. Metapolities control the interactions of the mult,iple policies.
Multiple Domains
A policy domain is a logical const,ruct defining t,he area of responsihilit,y of a,n a.ut,horit,y. The U.S. federal government, for example, t.a.kes responsibilit,y for regulating interstate commerce (t,he federal doma.in), while the states take responsibilit,y for regulating intrasta.te commerce (the 50 st.at,e domains). NCSC. OSI, ISO, ECMA, DOD, and NATO are a few of t.he well-known securit,y domain a.uthorities.
Ea.ch securit,y doma.in ma.y be aut,onomous, wit 11 its own a.uthorit,y. subject,s, object,s, policies, and policy enforcement, mechanisms. Ot,liers may be part. of a hierarchical st,ruct.ure, like Air Force Base (AFB), Air Force System Commailtl(AFSC:), Air Force (AF). and Dept,. of Dcfense( DOD). In 1lierarchica.l st.rllct.urrs, the aut.hority and policies of 1.1~ t,op doma.ins must. be incorporat,ed by t.he subordina.tc, domains. lrntlcr the unified-policy model, the base, system command, AF and DOD policies would be int.egrat.ecl and implement.ed a.s a. single aut.omat.ed security policy. tlowever, under t.he Multipolicy Para.digm, each of t,lie individual policies in the hierarchy -t,he DOD policy, the AF policy, t,he AFSC policy ant1 t.he AFB policywould be separat.e policies, and a policy domain code would be requirecl for ea.&. This gives t.he AFB securit,y administ,ral.or the flexibility t,o change local base policy whilr leaving national DOD and .+\I: policic,s unt~ouched. Doma.ins may overlap each other, so t,hat subjects or objects may belong t,o more t,liaii one domain and fa.11 under more t.han one policy. Pat.ient,s who fa.ll under the confidentialit,y policies of multiple st.a.tes, and military informa.tion which comes under b0t.h na.tional and int,erna.tional confident,ialit,y policies. are m(:mbers of overlapped clomains.
Policies in different domains may conflict,. llowever, there must. be means t.0 resolve l.hc conflicts as t.hey occur. For example, if a national ancl ail int,ernat.iona.l policy are in conflict.. which l.akes precedence? A lat.er se&on adclresses conflict. Or. if t,he policies reflect. t.he ranking of the authorities wllo crratc,tl t.liein, t,llell the policies of the domina,nt authority predominate. This strategy is a.ppropriat,e in t.he milit,ary and other hierarchica.lly-st,ructured organizations. The problem is that t#he resolution may unravel as soon as it leaves the hiera.rchy.
The sea captain's authority dominates only while at sea. The marriage must be blessed by authorities on land as well.
Translate policies into a common form.. Dr. Bell advocates this strat*egy using policy conversion logic on a Universal Lattice Machine. He showed that multinationalsharing, Clark and Wilson, dynamic separation of duty aad ORCON can all be implemented with the Universa.l La.ttice Machine. Apparent contra.dictions or dift'erences may disappea.r when the policy is a common form. John Pa.ge [27] , Ma.rshall Abrams [28] , Leonard La.Pa.dula. , a,nd others' showed how rule bases (rules with one-to-one correspondence with the operations of t,he system) handle many kinds of a.ccess cont,rol policies. LaPadula proposed a. vot.ing technique t,o resolve rule conflicts which we adopt in Figure 2 .
Adjudicafion.
In case of conflict,, develop a solut.ion which reflects the tradeoffs and weights of the users on the system. If there are mult,iple applications which weigh things clifferent,ly, a.ccommodate the various weights. The use of meta.policies, or 'policies about policies', to sort out precedence and to identify and resolve policy conflict,s is illustrated in Figure 2. Outside m.ediation. When t,wo securit.y policies contradict each other, the decision about, what t.o do may be best left to a. human who unclerst~ands the content and the cont,est 1 as iu downgrade tlecisions.
A combination of these techniques ca.n be powerful. Figure 2 shows t.ha.t the conflict resolut.ion process can be simple and elegant, no ma.tter how many different, policies are included. If pa.ra.llel processors are used t,o implement multiple policies [l], t.he decision-making time could be kept, close t,o t,hat. of a single-policy machine.
Policy Assignments
Implementation of multiple policies a.nd metapolities on information systems requires a. way to tell w1ia.t policies should be enforced on wha.t data. Current,ly, mandatory access corkol policies (MAC) use sensitivity labels t,o describe security at,t.ribut.es. and implicit,ly assume t,ha.t t.he MAC policy is t,he one t.o be enforced.
Dat,a Securit,y proposed in [4] t.o estt~nd (.he stxnsit.ivit,y label t,o accommodate mult.iple policies. The E~lro-pea.11 Comput,er hIa.nufact,urers Associa.tiou (ECRI A) [17] has proposed securit.y domain codes on security labels which indica.te under which label convent.ion the la,bel is forma.tted, for esa.mple, t,he Int.ernational Standards Orga.niza.tion (ISO). We propose securit,y policy doma.in codes as a mechanism t,o indica.te which policy doma.ins apply t,o this sul,ject,, object., or policy. Whenever policy decisions are made. t.liese policy domain codes would be cht~ckt~tl first. so t,liat 1 he propel policy enforcers caii be invoked. Figure 1 G. The resulting 'Yes' or 'No' vote is sent back to the Policy Enforcer which then permits or denies the requested opera.tion.
Flexible User Security Policies
One of the frustrations experienced by users is t,heir limited abilit,y to modify t,he securit,y policies which are built into COTS pr0duct.s. h!Iost. current. syst,ems allow changes to the policy da.ta. (eg. the content,s of the lattice), but not to the policy rules. The problems are:
1. the rules are built in; 2. assurance depends upon a st,able policy; 3. cha.nges may introduce securit,y fla,ws.
User ranking.
A simple scheme is to allow user authorities to ra,nk t,he multiple policies in their system. The policies do not ha.ve to be changed, but user authorities can prioritize policies t.o emphasize those that are most, import.ant, t,o t.heir organization's goals. For example, ava.ilability is critical to reserva.tion.9 systems, pa.tient, monit,oring, Ina,nufa.ct,uring processrs. As severad people have noted, t,lie milit,a.ry will usually empha.size confidentia1it.y over int.rgrit,y. while commercial iiistit,ut.ions like ba.uks. iiialirnuce compa.uies. ret.ailers, a.nd maiirifact,orirs an' likely t.0 riiiphasizcr int,egrit,y over auyt.hing else. SW Figure ~1 .
Tailoring
Colmnercial Off-Tile-Sllelf (COTS) systems. Users complain frequent,ly about, how difficult it. is to t.ailor any current trusted system to their own needs. A vendor designing a. t,rust,ed multiple policy syst.em t.ries to meet, the needs of the largest ma.rket groups. bllt ca.nnot. ant.icipat,e the tota. needs of every eveiit.ual user. For the vendor, it. is much easier t.o include many policies in t.he system and market, one' mult.ilevel secure product t,o diverse cust.omcr communit.ies \vhich prioritize t.he mult.iple policic,s to best ineet. Iheir own goa.ls. See Figure 5 . Adaptive policies. User priorit,ies ma.y suddenly change.
For exa.mple, when t.he t.hreat, level cha,nges, the milit.ary quickly changes security policies. Cars a.t a. base must. be pa,rked furt.her away from buildings. and data may be classified at the next higher level. In many milit.a.ry systems, conficlentia.lit,y is t.hc goal during pcacel.ime. but a.va.ilabi1it.y is t,lie goal ilS soon as war brf?al;s out.
Current syst,ems do not, handle change well. Built,-in policies a.re t,he keyst.one of building and evaluat,ing t,oda.y's syst,em. A change in policy mea.ns rebuilding and reevaluating the trusted system. However, if the policies are alrea,dy in the system, it is a. simple mat,ter to change the rankings so that, t,here is a switch in policy. See Figure G . In summary, in a multiple policy syst,em user authorities will rank policies for severa.l rea.sons. Weapon Release 0 0 3. The vendor could tailor t,he syst.em before shipping, or the System Security Oficer (SSO) could tailor it at system generat,ion. The vendor should ship any trusted system with conserva.tive defaults selected to err on the side of ca.ution.
4. Vendor-provided opt,ions, such a.s a.udit policy options and default opt,ions, can be set. by the SSO at any time.
Addiug user policies. Although inconceiva,ble with today's built-in policies, user a.uthorities should be able to add or delete policies from their systems at any time. Standa.rcliaed policies and la.bels may be distributed on ROM firmware [4] or protected software modules and would include meta.polities which describe the policies and t.heir interrelabionships. Metapolicies which coordina.te t,he policies must be customized to the user's needs when each policy is installed.
Currently, user policies a.re coded many times int,o applications programs. It is desirable for integrit,y and control to get the policy out, of the applica.tion a.nd into the system where the sa.me policy can be invoked by ma.ny programs. Ideally, a System Scxurit,y 0% cer (SSO) should be able to ent.er ent,ire user policies via trusted software into an isola.ted a.rea. of t,he TCB where their interactions wit.11 applica.tions programs and other policies a.re ca.refully mediated by t.lrr appropriate met,apolicies.
The capa.cit.y to a.bsorb mult~iple user policies (represent.ing mult,iple nat,ions, multiple divisions. or several kinds of iiit,egrit,y policies) wit.hout. reevaluat.ing t.lie whole syst.em is a.n int.egral part, of t.lre Rlultipolicy Model. However, evolut.ion of policies raises t.he issues of reeva.luat.ion and recrrt.ifica.t.ion.
Evaluation and Certification Issues
How does one evaluat,e and certify a syst.em wit,11 multiple flexible policies? If policies change. whet.her at sysgen or on-the-fly. when must. t.he syst.em he reevaluat,ed or recert.ifietl? There arta many quest~ions and problems.
Today, evaluat,ors det,ermine whet.ller or not, a system correct,ly implement,s a policy wit.11 what. degree of assurance. The Mult,ipolicy Paradigm requires a shift.
